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PR I D E AN D PR EJ U D ICE OR S E N S E AN D
S E N S I B I LITY? A PRAG MATIC PROPOSAL
FOR TH E R ECR U ITM E NT OF J U DG E S
AT TH E ICC AN D OTH E R I NTE R NATIONAL
CR I M I NAL COU RTS
Michael Bohlander*
Empirical research has shown that the selection and recruitment of judges at
the international criminal courts may not always conform with the criteria set
out in the courts’ statutes, and that the requirements can differ from court to
court. There is concern that judicial positions are handed out on the basis of
membership in informal political networks, also called nepotism. This paper
summarizes the previous findings and looks at the question of how an adequate
standard of judicial candidates can be maintained across the entire system.
I . I NTROD UCTION
A court is only as good as the judges who staff it. It has been said that
“[t]he calibre and experience of the judges of the Court is essential for the
success of the ICC.”1 In previous publications2 I have voiced doubts and
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1. Zhu Wen-qi & Sureta Chana, Article 36: Qualiﬁcations, Nomination and Election of
Judges, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’
Notes, Article by Article, n.1 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Triffterer].
2. See Michael Bohlander, The International Criminal Judiciary: Problems of Judicial
Selection, Independence and Ethics, in International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis 
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added my own to those of others about whether the current procedure for
selecting the judges of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals
measures up to the required standard. The 2001 report on the ICTR by
the International Crisis Group would appear to prove that I am not alone.3
Leaving aside recurrent charges of nepotism—i.e., political nominations
for loyal and trusted party members or government ofﬁcials, etc. by the
government of the day—or package deals between states for high U.N. of-
ﬁces, the issue that this paper is meant to address and that at the end of
the day is the crucial one is the following: How can we make sure that only
those with the highest qualiﬁcations and the most relevant experience will
be appointed to be judges at the ICC, or international criminal courts in
general? In theory, even the beneﬁciaries of nepotism can be highly qual-
iﬁed, although research at the national level would appear to cast some
doubt on this,4 so while nepotism is deplorable, it may not be a sufﬁcient
reason to doubt a candidate’s aptitude for the job. However, comparisons5
with advertisements for judicial ofﬁces at the local level within the U.N.
system, such as, for example, in Kosovo, have shown that many of the
judges at the three great international criminal courts, the ICTY, ICTR,
and ICC, would have stood no chance of obtaining a judgeship at a district
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of Institutions and Procedures 325 (Michael Bohlander ed., 2007), with references to ear-
lier articles.
3. “Beyond the ofﬁcial explanations and arguments about procedure or bad legal ad-
ministration which are given ample space in the 1999 expert report, the judges are held re-
sponsible to a large extent for this unjustiﬁable situation. The poor output of the Tribunal
is linked to the mediocre productivity of judges, some of whom are incapable of running
criminal trials and to their often-prolonged absences. Moreover, in their work, the tribu-
nal chambers, which deal with the most serious crimes in cases that are often dense and
complex, have relied to an abnormal extent on young legal assistants, even on interns.
Given this assessment, judges should be held accountable for their work. International
Crisis Group recommends, in the ﬁrst instance, that the selection of judges should be more
rigorously organised and that candidates who have not had solid experience as a judge in
criminal affairs should be rejected.” International Crisis Group, International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed 11 (June 7, 2001), available at http://www.crisis-
group.org/home/index.cfm?id=1649&l=1.
4. See Michael Bohlander & Christian Latour, The German Judiciary in the Nineties
(1998). The study found that on average judges at the German Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof ) who were members of a political party were less qualiﬁed than their
brethren who had no party membership, but were promoted faster to the Federal Court
than the non-party members.
5. Bohlander, supra note 2, at 354–55.
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court in Kosovo because they require a minimum of ten years’ practice in
criminal cases and at least ﬁve years as a criminal trial judge. In other
words, there is a huge discrepancy between the qualiﬁcations required for
the grunt-work in a district court and the lofty heights of international
justice in The Hague and elsewhere, which is after all setting the pace on
a global scale and has a trickle-down effect as states adapt their systems to
the emerging international standards. If anything, we cannot afford judi-
cial amateurs at that level. Apparently, the people who negotiated the law
on the qualiﬁcations of judges were overly guided by the way proceedings
are run in the International Court of Justice, where speed is rarely of the
essence and where none of the parties are held in detention pending trial.6
Coupled with the adoption of a cumbersome adversarial mode of proce-
dure not required by the nature of the tribunals but imposed nonetheless
by the overbearing inﬂuence of the common law countries, the lack of real
criminal trial and case management experience of many of the judges at
the ad hoc tribunals and the extensive use of young and inexperienced le-
gal assistants have, among other factors such as less than perfect prepara-
tion of the prosecution case, led to a backlog of cases and resulted in the
prolonged detention of accused, raising human rights challenges from the
ﬁrst days of the tribunals’ operation.
I think it is fair to say that a lot will depend on the individual judge’s
attitude that determines how much control he will have and/or exercise
over a case before him. Combine this with the fact that new judges are not
given any training before they start in their new post and one has a recipe
for trouble. This paper argues that the States Parties should do all they can
to ensure that this danger born of the reliance on individual abilities and
proclivities is rooted out to the extent possible and that all judges are en-
abled to hit the ground running the day they take ofﬁce. It progresses from
the assumption, explained in my previous work,7 that the present state of
affairs does not come near such a standard. I make no bones, either, about
my conviction that I consider diplomats, government ofﬁcials, and aca-
demics ill-suited for such an important and complex judicial ofﬁce, unless
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6. In her recent Ph.D. thesis on lawmaking at the international tribunals, Nicole Ruth
Schlesinger, Melbourne University, has found interesting evidence about state interaction
and perceived conditions for interaction by the judges. The as yet unpublished thesis is on
ﬁle with the author.
7. See Bohlander, supra note 2.
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they have also had substantial judicial experience in complex criminal
cases. I will try to set out proposals for achieving a state where all candi-
dates for vacancies start from a similar position and are already fully con-
versant with the status quo of international criminal law when they or
their governments declare their candidacy. International criminal justice is
no place for on-the-job-training.
I I . TH E D EVE LOPM E NT AN D STATE OF TH E LAW 
AT TH E ICC
Let us take a look at the law under the ICC Statute8 which is after all the main
focus of this special issue; the situation at other courts is, however, not that
different. There have so far been no rules or regulations made with respect to
the qualiﬁcations of judicial candidates. The law is set out in Article 36:
Article 36
Qualiﬁcations, nomination and election of judges
. . . .
3. (a) The judges shall be chosen from among persons of high moral char-
acter, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualiﬁcations required in their
respective States for appointment to the highest judicial ofﬁces.
(b) Every candidate for election to the Court shall:
(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the
necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in
other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings; or
(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such
as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive
experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial
work of the Court;
. . . .
4. . . . .
(c) The Assembly of States Parties may decide to establish, if appropriate,
an Advisory Committee on nominations. In that event, the Committee’s com-
position and mandate shall be established by the Assembly of States Parties.
. . . .
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8. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 1, 2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/
ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Ofﬁcial+Journal/Rome+Statute.htm.
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To date, there exists no advisory committee as envisaged by Article 36.
The history of the ICC law on the issue of qualiﬁcations is far from uni-
form.9 Based on the experience of the ICTY, some countries in the
Assembly of State Parties (ASP) wanted to introduce more practice-
oriented criteria, but this met with little success. The travaux préparatoires
to the ICC Statute are a testament to the power of diplomacy over practi-
tioners’ experience and concerns. Article 6 of the ILC Draft stated that
candidates should have “in addition: (a) criminal trial experience; (b) rec-
ognized competence in international law” which under traditional inter-
pretation rules would be read as a cumulative requirement. The ad hoc
committee of the 1996 Preparatory Committee, under paragraph 20 of its
report, stated that “concerning the appointment of the prosecutor, ex-
pertise in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases was consid-
ered to be an important requirement,” but that insisting on criminal or
international law experience with the judges was seen by some as “unduly
restricting the sources of expertise on which the court should be able to
rely.” Given that the Prosecutor as the head of the prosecution service at
the ICC will hardly do much investigation and prosecution himself, that
difference in approach appears doubtful. What the “sources of expertise”
might be becomes evident from the comments by Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Libya, and Qatar at the 1996 Prep Comm: “Experience in crimi-
nal matters (judicial prosecutorial or defense advocacy) is, in part, neces-
sary, but not to the exclusion of other expertise. The words of Article 6
‘. . . for appointment to the highest judicial ofﬁces . . .’ are too limiting
since most legal systems do not have judicial appointments by career
judges. The present formulation means that only career judges are eligible,
and therefore, this formulation should be changed.” The United Kingdom
argued for a phrase containing the words “criminal trial experience and,
where possible, recognized competence in international law.” This shows
a commonsense approach to the necessities of judging, whether in a do-
mestic context or in the international arena. Many delegates of the 1998
Diplomatic Conference thought that trial experience should at least be re-
quired for the judges of the Pre-Trial and Trial chambers. The insistence on
previous practical experience together with or as an alternative to competence
in international law can be found in the proposals of Switzerland, Portugal,
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9. The following section is a modiﬁed excerpt of Bohlander, supra note 2, at 355–57.
References have been omitted.
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Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, and France at the
1996 Prep Comm. Article 30[6] of the 1998 Zutphen Draft was an ex-
pression of the confusion and range of opinions that afﬂicted the negoti-
ations, and the draft Article 37 put before the Rome Conference by the
1998 Prep Comm in A/CONF.183/2/ Add.1 was not much of an im-
provement either:
3. The judges of the Court shall:
(a) be persons of high moral character and impartiality [who possess all the
qualiﬁcations required in their respective States for appointment to the high-
est judicial ofﬁces]; [and]
(b) have:
(i) [at least ten years’] [extensive] criminal [law] [trial] experience [as a judge,
prosecutor or defending counsel]; [or] [and, where possible]
(ii) recognized competence in international law [in particular international
criminal law, international humanitarian law and human rights law] [; and (c)
possess an excellent knowledge of and be ﬂuent in at least one of the working
languages referred to in article 51].
The text of Article 37 transmitted by the Drafting Committee to the
Committee of the Whole contains a reference to competence in criminal
law and procedure gained through judicial or prosecutorial as well as de-
fense experience or a similar capacity, and to competence in international
law with reference to extensive professional legal capacity of relevance to
the judicial work of the court. Any doubt as to whether these were meant
to be cumulative or alternative requirements were dispelled by the ﬁnal
version of Article 36 of the Rome Statute, which inserted the word “or”
between them—a regrettable move owed to diplomatic comity rather than
common sense.
The Statute now reads “established” competence—yet one must be al-
lowed to ask: Established by what method, on what grounds? Citation fre-
quency index? Peer review? Membership of national or U.N. committees,
government ofﬁce, etc.? Equivalence to the jurists mentioned in Article 38
of the ICJ Statute? Neither the Statute nor the Rules or Regulations pro-
vide any further explanations. The two main commentaries on the ICC
are silent on the matter.10 I have been both a judge and an academic and
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10. Zhu Wen-qi & Sureta Chana, Article 36, in Triffterer, supra note 1, at nn.4–5; John
R.W.D. Jones, Composition of the Court, in 1 The Rome Statute of the International
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have seen both categories of people poaching in the domain of the other.
I have no hesitation in saying that in my experience, (professional) judges
usually do a better job at academic work than academics at judging. That
should come as no surprise: Any domestic criminal judge can learn what
there needs to be known about the development of international human-
itarian and criminal law over the last 200 years in an eight-week intensive
crash course and ﬁll any remaining lacunae by reading the relevant mate-
rials. However, twenty years of criminal judicial and case management ex-
perience can only be gained through undergoing twenty years of criminal
judicial and case management experience. Experience as an advocate or
prosecutor alone will not provide the same experience. Countries with ca-
reer judiciaries usually start new judges off in areas where their lack of ex-
perience will do the least damage, or they put them in collegiate panels
where they can learn from more experienced colleagues. Countries with-
out a career judiciary normally require a certain minimum professional ex-
perience in the law before they appoint to the bench, although the picture
becomes a little bit more blurred there,11 and I will not even dwell on the
vast differences of experience that national systems require for someone to
become a judge in the ﬁrst place, and in order to be appointed to the high-
est judicial ofﬁce.12 Why should this sensible approach suddenly stop only
because the ofﬁce we appoint to is outside—and in fact often above—the
national judiciary? Is it acceptable that new judges without any prior ex-
perience as a judge or even prosecutor or defense counsel in national or in-
ternational trials are immediately appointed to the immensely inﬂuential
ICTY/ICTR Appeals Chamber, as happened with a currently serving
judge, without having to earn their spurs in trial work?13 Do undisputed
achievements as an academic and expertise in humanitarian law really
qualify one for such a stellar career in the international judiciary? What
about candidates who have no legal education or professional training as
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Criminal Court: A Commentary 242–44 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D.
Jones eds., 2002). In the chapter “Transnational,” in The International Criminal Court:
Recommendations on Policy and Practice 153–55 (2003), Thordis Ingadottir gives a slightly
more detailed picture but nothing expounding on the substance of the qualiﬁcations.
11. See Bohlander, supra note 2, at 357–62.
12. See supra note 10 and infra note 13.
13. See Press Release CVO/P.I.S./639e, ICTY (Nov. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.icty.org/sid/7931.
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a lawyer at all?14 Judge Patricia Wald has rightly said that judgment writing is
not primarily about creating a historical record or developing international
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14. See www.icc-cpi.int/asp/election_2007/cand_3.html. On the Japanese judicial ca-
reer paths, see the paper by John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity,
Autonomy and the Public Trust, available at http://law.wustl.edu/higls/papers/lectures/
2003-3HaleyJapaneseJudiciary.html, where he states that the judges of the Japanese
Supreme Court do not all have to be career judges, yet the law on Supreme Court judges
requires the following:
Article 41 of the 1947 Court Organization Law
Justices of the Supreme Court shall be appointed from among persons of broad vision and
extensive knowledge of law, who are not less than forty years of age. At least ten of them shall
be persons who have held one or two of the positions mentioned in item (i) or (ii) for not less
than ten years, or one or more positions mentioned in the following items for a total period
of twenty years or more:
(i) President (cho¯kan) of a high court
(ii) Judge
(iii) Summary court judge
(iv) Public prosecutor
(v) Lawyer
(vi) Professor or assistant professor (jokyo¯ju) in law in universities as determined separately
by statute.
“Extensive knowledge of the law” with a degree in English and a career in administration
and foreign politics as an ambassador? The interpretation given for that term on the Web
site of the Supreme Court of Japan at www.courts.go.jp/english/system/system.html#07 is:
Justices of the Supreme Court shall be appointed from among persons with a broad vision and
extensive knowledge of law. At least ten Justices must be selected from among those who dis-
tinguish themselves as judges, public prosecutors, attorneys, and professors or assistant pro-
fessors of legal science at universities; the rest do not need to be jurists. [emphasis added].
How one can obtain extensive knowledge of the law without being a jurist of some sort is
open to question. Haley goes on to describe the procedure for appointing the Chief Justice:
Illustrative is the Mainichi Shinbun Social Affairs Bureau account of the appointment of
Ryo¯hachi Kusaba as Japan’s twelfth Chief Justice in February 1990. Two months before the ap-
pointment, soon-to-retire Chief Justice Kyo¯ichi Yaguchi visited the official residence of then
Prime Minister Kaifu. The purpose was to inform the prime minister of the judiciary’s choice
for his replacement; a choice made with the participation of the principal administrators of the
judicial branch—all career judges themselves. Kaifu did not object. As one official is quoted to
have said (translated into idiomatic English): “We wouldn’t have the vaguest idea who anyone they
might suggest was, and we wouldn’t have any way of finding out whether they would be suitable.
The Supreme Court people have researched this. We trust their judgment.” A similar procedure
has been followed in the appointment of every Chief Justice since 1962 [emphasis added].
In an e-mail of October 23, 2008 to the author, Professor Haley explained the following:
Until a couple of years ago even a practicing lawyer, judge or prosecutor need not have a law
degree (undergraduate) as long as he or she had an undergraduate degree in some field and
passed the entrance exam for admission to the Legal Training and Research Institute, formerly
a two year training program that involved internships with a court (civil and criminal divi-
sions), a prosecutors’ office, and a law firm, each with [sic] for three months. As the number 
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law,15 but about writing a ruling in the individual case. That is what judges
are trained to do, in addition to their academic education. Had the wis-
dom behind her words been heeded from the beginning, I am sure that
the judgments at the ICTY and ICTR would not have been nearly half as
long as they turned out to be and still are. But I digress.
I I I . WH E R E DO WE GO FROM H E R E?
It seems likely that we are stuck with the substance of Article 36.
Amending it to go back to a preponderance of criminal judicial experience
to the exclusion of advocates, prosecutors, or criminal law academics or a
separate category based on “established competence” in international hu-
manitarian and human rights law is not really a realistic option. We need
to get around the existing law in a way that no one can legitimately object
to, namely by de facto combining the two categories. Although the cur-
rent nominations for the 2009 judicial elections show that there is still a
process of cross-fertilization going on between the ad hocs and the ICC—
and the same applies to other international courts—this period will even-
tually pass. We must make provision for that time. If we had a pool of
national judges that have solid experience in criminal trials and are fully
conversant and up-to-date with the status quo and the developments in
international criminal justice, what legitimate argument could be made by
anyone to prefer to them instead an academic, a diplomat, or a government
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of persons passing the entrance exam without a law degree (but almost always with extensive
preparation for the exam) increased, a new Law School system was instituted. Although one could
enter the now greatly curtailed (6 month) LTRI training program without having either an un-
dergraduate or postgraduate law degree though a qualifying examination, few if any are anticipated.
Another example of the limited usefulness of the reference in Article 36 and similar provi-
sions to the national laws on judiciaries.
15. Cited in Bohlander, supra note 2, at 326–27. In my eyes it is also a fallacy to believe
that one could seriously attempt to build an accurate historical record based on the selected
evidence presented by both prosecution and defense in the politically highly charged ad-
versarial settings, with the judges not knowing what exculpatory evidence the prosecution
may withhold and the defense being under no obligation to disclose any incriminating ev-
idence. An experienced trial judge should have been far less likely to fall for that misap-
prehension than those who are used to walking the corridors of diplomatic and political
power with their sweeping statements of intent and policy that are by necessity devoid of
substantial declarations to which those who utter them could later be held.
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ofﬁcial with no judicial experience, no matter how many books they have
written, how many conferences they have attended and spoken at, or how
many committees they have sat on? We all know what these conferences
and committees are like. We all have been to and sat on some of them at
one stage or another in our careers. We all have written articles and books.
If that is what is meant by “extensive experience in a professional legal ca-
pacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court,” does any-
one honestly think that sort of work even begins to replace the experience
of many years of learning to deal with victims and witnesses, assessing
credibility, sifting through evidence, distinguishing relevant facts from ir-
relevant ones, balancing the interests of prosecution and defense against
each other, acquiring case management skills, cooperating and deliberat-
ing on a collegiate panel as well as honing the craft of judgment writing
to a ﬁne art? Or does it not rather teach the art of compromise, some may
say, that was employed by the Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza No. 2,16
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16. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision on Prosecutor’s
Request for Review or Reconsideration (Mar. 31, 2000). That spirit of compromise appears
to be alive and well in 2008: The ICC Appeals Chamber on October 21, 2008 overturned
a decision by a Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case that had ordered the release of the ac-
cused because the proceedings had been stayed. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, No. ICC-
01/04-01/06 OA 12, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of
Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo” (Oct. 21,
2008) [hereinafter OA 12], with a dissenting opinion by Judge Pikis. On the same day, it
afﬁrmed the stay ordered by the Trial Chamber because in the view of the Trial Chamber
the disclosure practice of the Prosecutor made a fair trial impossible. See id., No. ICC-
01/04-01/06 OA 13, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of
Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision on the Consequences of Non-disclosure etc.” (Oct. 21,
2008) [hereinafter OA 13]. The stay was treated as conditional in OA 12 and 13, an inter-
pretation that was justiﬁable on the basis of the wording of the Trial Chamber’s decision.
However, the Appeals Chamber ordered the continued detention of Lubanga and referred
the case back to the Trial Chamber for reconsideration under those “sailing orders.” The
Appeals Chamber in all seriousness appeared to ask the Trial Chamber to consider the of-
fers made by the U.N. to allow the judges to see the material in a room in the Peace Palace,
but where they would not be allowed to make notes; they could make notes outside the
room and a representative of the U.N. would at all times have to be present in the room,
thus perhaps being privy to deliberating conversations of the judges; full documents would
not be made available, but only summaries. This approach, if that was indeed the Appeals
Chamber’s attitude, would betray a fundamental lack of understanding of and disrespect
for the judicial process by the U.N. and is a prime example of diplomatic interference. The
unfairness extant at the time of the Trial Chamber decision, moreover, would thus have
continued in all likelihood. See OA 12, ¶ 41. How the Appeals Chamber thought that this
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when it reversed its previous decision because Rwanda threatened to cease
its cooperation after the accused had been ordered to be released based on
prosecutorial misconduct—compromise being an art that belongs in the
poison garden of judicial activity in criminal proceedings?
What we therefore need to do is to arrive at a state of affairs where the
choice between the two categories is one of theory only, not of practice,
because the selecting bodies would be presented with a pool of judicial
candidates who have the necessary experience and have been thoroughly
PR I DE AN D PR EJ U DICE OR SE NSE AN D SE NSI B I L ITY? | 539
unworthy procedure could alleviate the concerns of the defense is open to question. Only
Judge Pikis, who treated the stay as permanent despite the ambiguous language of the Trial
Chamber, actually realized the consequence of the stay for the liberty of the accused: The
proceedings are unfair and cannot proceed at the moment, based on the conduct of the
Prosecutor. The trial is therefore over unless the Prosecutor can remedy the defects.
Combined with the presumption in favor of the liberty of the accused, who is after all still
protected by the presumption of innocence, the inevitable conclusion was indeed the im-
mediate release. Anything else would mean, as Judge Pikis—who has a substantial judicial
background—rightly said, a preventative detention on the off-chance that the Prosecutor
would get it right some day—see OA 12 Dissenting Opinion, ¶¶ 13, 16–17. That the Appeals
Chamber thought that, after two years and six months of custody and a lamentable per-
formance over many months by the Prosecution and the U.N., the human rights limit for
a violation of the right to a speedy trial as a permanent bar on custody had not been
reached, is difﬁcult to accept. The Appeals Chamber had a chance to say “The buck stops
here!”; instead, they passed it back to the Trial Chamber.
Does it have to do with the background of the majority? It is, of course, difﬁcult to es-
tablish a monocausal connection, but the following can be said: The other judges in this case
had mostly little experience as practitioners, let alone as judges, and although they have pro-
fessional legal qualiﬁcations, much of their actual careers appear to have been spent in
government-related work, academia, or diplomacy. Judge Kourula’s CV lists him as
having served as a district judge in 1979 (www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP_ej2_ﬁn-
cv_En.pdf); Judge Kirsch has no judicial experience although he is a member of the Quebec
bar and was made a QC in 1988 (www.icc-cpi.int/presidency/president.html, accessed on 23
October 2008); Judge Song was a Judge Advocate in the Korean Army from 1964 to 1967,
i.e., a military prosecutor for the ﬁrst six months and a military judge for two and a half
years (www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP_ej2_kor-cv.pdf ); Judge Nsereko has been an
advocate in criminal cases since 1972, but has no judicial experience, either (www.icc-
cpi.int/library/asp/CV. English.Uganda.19_july_2007.pdf). It is, however, surprising to see
that the judges who had experience as advocates subscribed to the majority view. One would
have thought that they of all people would understand the point of view of the defense.
The stay has been lifted in the meantime after an admirable and gargantuan effort by
the Trial Chamber, presided over by British High Court Judge Adrian Fulford, to make the
Prosecution (and the information providers) comply to the extent possible with the duties
toward the court and the defense. See Lubanga, No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1644, Reasons for
Oral Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings (Jan. 23, 2009).
NCLR1204_04.qxd  11/6/09  5:06 PM  Page 539
trained in the international law aspects of their work. We also need to es-
tablish trans-systemic minimum quality levels. To achieve this end, I pro-
pose the following:
• Establishment of an international pool of candidates—a judicial task
force
UNMIK has led the way in showing how, for a regional and local
court system with an international element, the creation of a pool of
adequate international candidates is necessary and feasible in order
to ensure maximum efﬁciency in recruiting new judges when neces-
sary. This is evidence of prudent planning. However, the strictures
and requirements of a national operation such as UNMIK are not
the same as those for an international criminal court. The training
aspect must receive a much greater emphasis in the selection process.
Given that the number of candidates required at any given time is
not that high, the membership of the pool need not be very large,
but it should be continuously replenished as necessary. A smaller
pool would also guarantee that the body electing candidates to the
pool would be able to pick only those with the highest qualiﬁca-
tions. To the extent possible within the quality requirements, the
pool selectors should strive for ethnic and gender balance.
• A U.N.- or ASP-based administration
The administration of the pool of candidates should be in the hands
of an international body to ensure uniformity of training. There
should be no automatic right of states to nominate candidates to the
pool, but selection should be made by the administering ofﬁce on
merits alone. This could be the U.N. if the pool was to be used for
all international/ized courts, or a subcommittee of the ASP, for ex-
ample, the Advisory Committee mentioned in Article 36 if it was
only to be done for the ICC. I prefer the former, which would still
leave the ASP enough room for cooperation. It would also allow for
the inclusion of any other international criminal tribunals. The actual
training could be performed by internationally qualiﬁed trainers at
the national judicial academies of the States Parties, so there would be
no need to create a new institution at the international level.
• Selection from judiciaries of states
Candidates for the pool would be selected from the national profes-
sional judiciaries only. Depending on the system, public prosecutors
might also be included, but that would need careful consideration of
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their status with respect to the national judiciaries, e.g., what degree
of independence do they enjoy. The experience as a prosecutor—or
defense counsel at that—alone does not normally equate fully to the
responsibilities and skills required of a judge.
• Minimum experience as criminal trial judges before inclusion in pool
All candidates would have to show a minimum period of practical ex-
perience in judicial criminal trial work, to which to some extent ex-
perience as a defense counsel or public prosecutor could be credited
as an added value. Again, as in the previous paragraph, this would
need very careful consideration. The fact that some systems do not
use career judiciaries and that consequently their candidates might
not be considered as sufﬁciently experienced is not a justiﬁable argu-
ment for reducing the quality of the personnel stafﬁng the courts. If
their candidates need to be older than those of other countries in or-
der to gain comparable experience, so be it.
• Minimum and maximum age requirements
Although this may irritate proponents of age equality, I feel that
common sense dictates that candidates for international courts
should have seen enough of the world and have the necessary matu-
rity for the complex and intellectually as well as emotionally drain-
ing work in criminal trials dealing with atrocities of the kind we are
talking about. They should also still be physically and mentally ﬁt
for the job. As a ﬁrst suggestion, nobody should be appointed under
the age of 45 or above the age of 60. National retirement ages are
there for a reason; there is no cause to think that people who have to
retire from their national judicial posts because of their age will not
face similar if not more serious burdens in an international setting.
If pool members cross the maximum age limit without having been
appointed to an international judgeship, they should automatically
lose their pool member status.
• Command of languages
It goes without saying that those elected to the pool would already
have to have an excellent command of English as the main lingua
franca in international law. They should be examined formally on that.
To the extent possible, pool members with a sufﬁcient command of
another language likely to be used as a working language should re-
ceive further training in it. All pool members should be rigorously
trained in legal terminology and the attendant substantive and pro-
cedural concepts connected to it.
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• Regular continuing professional development (CPD) of the members of
the pool
The training of the pool members in the international law aspects of
criminal justice should occur on a regular basis, at previously set in-
tervals recognized by their national justice administration as part of
their judicial duties, and should be considered as performance capa-
ble of leading to national promotion, to give people an incentive to
apply for the pool. After an initial intensive and longer training pe-
riod there should be at least two courses per year to keep the pool
members updated. Training should not only cover the international
law proper, but also the understanding of common law and civil law
approaches, of different procedural models and the consequences for
the proceedings in practice, such as, for example, drafting of decisions
and judgments. It should also include some kind of moot court train-
ing in the models used in international criminal courts. Participation
in the training should be mandatory and be monitored, as with na-
tional CPD programmes, by certiﬁcation of CPD points. Nonattend-
ance should lead to a loss of pool membership.
IV.  CONCLUS ION
This short paper can, of course, only scratch the surface of the problems of
judicial qualiﬁcations. Yet, I hope to have shown that it is no longer ac-
ceptable, and indeed no longer necessary, to rely on the haphazard method
of allowing national governments or even obscurely constituted “selection
committees”17 to nominate candidates who may or may not be qualiﬁed for
these demanding posts. We should strive to attain a state of affairs where all
the candidates are equally qualiﬁed in the international law aspects and
have comparable judicial experience. In this manner, as far as the ICC is
concerned, we could formally keep the questionable “or” in Article 36 ICC
Statute and surreptitiously let it transmogrify into a reasonable “and.”
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17. As, for example, with regard to the international judges for the Lebanese Tribunal;
see the interview with Nicola Michel at www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/
lebanon/2007/0612nicolamichel.htm: “As to the international ones, the member states will
submit proposals after we open the way for nominations. All these applications have to be
subject to the advice of the selection committee which will present its recommendations
to the U.N. secretary general.”
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